Publications
“Does valuing ice cream sandwiches make one a true gourmand and connoisseur of them?” forthcoming, Inquiry
“Bringing the deep self back to the racecourse: Rethinking accountability and the deep self,” forthcoming, Analytic Philosophy
Things I’ve been working on
A paper on aspiration (under review)
Robust aspiration involves 1) both the cognitive and the conative elements, which are 2) in resonance with each other, and is 3) a continuous endeavor.
A paper on compartmentalization and responsibility (under review)
Deep self views cannot account for a compartmentalized agent’s responsibility without undermining their plausibility.
A paper on a hierarchical model of aspiration
To aspire is to form and act from a hierarchy of personal policies.
A paper on responsibility for one’s self
Distinct sufficiency and necessity claims regarding responsibility for the self.
A paper on fictional cinematic narrators
Fictional cinematic narrators exist in every fictional film because only they have the right access to film narratives—organic unities of which filmic elements are parts.
email me for drafts ~
Things I’ll be working on real soon
A paper on being cool
A paper on bipolar disorder and the self
A paper on whether fictional cinematic narrators can suck
A paper on authenticity and narration in queer cinema
happy to chat :D
Dissertation
Your Self is Deeper Than You Think: A Deep Self View of Moral Responsibility
I defend a novel deep self view of moral responsibility in which an agent’s deep self plays an essential role. I argue that an agent acts freely and is morally responsible for what she does in the accountability sense only if she has a deep self for which she is responsible. To be responsible for her deep self, she must have a history where she was afforded the unimpeded opportunity to develop and exercise the ability to perform what I call aspirational self-shaping. Standard deep self views in the literature say something much stronger. They contend that an agent acts freely and responsibly for what she does if and only if her actions or omissions issue from, and so express, her deep self. By offering a necessary condition for accountability drawing upon resources concerning responsibility for the deep self, my view escapes the counterexamples that familiar views face, while retaining the core of deep self views. Indeed, an agent may be blameworthy for her wrongdoing without it issuing from, and so expressing, her deep self. And yet, I argue that she must have a deep self for which she is responsible to be blameworthy for her wrongdoing. This is achieved by paying closer attention to the historical dimension of the deep self than have other deep self proponents.