Publications
“Does valuing ice cream sandwiches make one a true gourmand and connoisseur of them?” forthcoming, Inquiry
“Bringing the deep self back to the racecourse: Rethinking accountability and the deep self,” forthcoming, Analytic Philosophy
Things I’ve been working on
A paper on aspiration (r&r)
Robust aspiration is something continuous, incorporates both cognitive and conative components, and involves a resonant relationship between these components.
A paper on compartmentalization and responsibility (under review)
Deep self views cannot account for a compartmentalized agent’s responsibility without undermining their plausibility.
A paper on a hierarchical model of aspiration
To aspire to something is to form, act on, and revise a hierarchy of personal policies about it.
A paper on responsibility for one’s self
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for being responsible for who we are?
A paper on fictional cinematic narrators
Only fictional cinematic narrators have the right access to film narratives—organic unities of which filmic elements are parts, while filmmakers and audience alike have full access to only the latter.
A paper on bipolar disorder, creativity, and the self
Can we rightfully attribute a bipolar agent’s creativity to themself, rather than to the extreme moods that both enhance and disrupt their creative process?
email me for drafts ~
Things I’ll be working on real soon
A paper on being cool
A paper on whether fictional cinematic narrators can “suck”
A paper on authenticity and narration in queer cinema
A paper on mental disorders, responsibility, and the excuse condition
happy to chat :D
Dissertation
Your Self is Deeper Than You Think: A Deep Self View of Moral Responsibility
I defend a novel deep self view of moral responsibility in which an agent’s deep self plays an essential role. I argue that an agent acts freely and is morally responsible for what she does in the accountability sense only if she has a deep self for which she is responsible. To be responsible for her deep self, she must have a history where she was afforded the unimpeded opportunity to develop and exercise the ability to perform what I call aspirational self-shaping. Standard deep self views in the literature say something much stronger. They contend that an agent acts freely and responsibly for what she does if and only if her actions or omissions issue from, and so express, her deep self. By offering a necessary condition for accountability drawing upon resources concerning responsibility for the deep self, my view escapes the counterexamples that familiar views face, while retaining the core of deep self views. Indeed, an agent may be blameworthy for her wrongdoing without it issuing from, and so expressing, her deep self. And yet, I argue that she must have a deep self for which she is responsible to be blameworthy for her wrongdoing. This is achieved by paying closer attention to the historical dimension of the deep self than have other deep self proponents.